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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Randy Michael Evans appeals from the district court’s Judgment of Conviction Upon a
Verdict of Guilty and Order of Commitment. Mr. Evans was sentenced to a unified sentence of
thirty-five years, with thirty years fixed, following a jury trial in which he was found guilty of
battery with the intent to commit murder.
During the trial, Mr. Evans made a motion for mistrial. The motion was made after a
State’s witness, Kayla Colson, informed the jury that she had warned Mr. Evans that, if he
continued with a plan to harm his ex-wife, “he would get caught and end up back in prison.”
Mr. Evans asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion for mistrial.
Furthermore, Mr. Evans asserts that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing
him to an excessive sentence without giving proper weight and consideration to the mitigating
factors that exist in his case. Further, he asserts that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence, I.C.R. 35.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On July 27, 2017, an Information was filed charging Mr. Evans with battery with intent
to commit a serious felony and a use of a deadly weapon enhancement.

(R., pp.90-91.)

Mr. Evans entered a plea of not guilty. (R., p.102.) Prior to trial, the charge was amended to
battery with the intent to commit murder and also included a weapon enhancement. (R., pp.204205.)
The State presented the testimony of Douglas Rieth, a neighbor of the alleged victim who
observed an out of place vehicle drive near his home (Tr., p.130, L.17 – p.138, L.3); Lori Rieth,
another neighbor who heard gunshots and then observed a man run away from her neighbor’s
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and drive away (Tr., p.138, L.14 – p.144, L.6); Rickey Hernandez, an individual that lived with
Mr. Evans’s girlfriend, Trish, and saw Mr. Evans on the night in question (Tr., p.144, Ls.21 –
p.154, L.160; Pamela Britt, another individual that lived with Trish and observed Trish and
Mr. Evans leave between 7:30 and 8:00 p.m. and return after 11:00 p.m. (Tr., p.155, L.3 – p.161,
L.23); Maria Botero, Mr. Rieth’s sister, who also heard shots and then saw a man run away from
the direction of the shooting and drive away (Tr., p.167, L.23 – p.172, L.9); Cheyann Lundstrom,
the alleged victim, who testified about the events on the night in question, the injuries she
sustained, and identified Mr. Evans as the person who shot her (Tr., p.184, L.14 – p.216, L.25);
Justin Tracy, a person living in the same home with Ms. Lundstrom, who heard shots, witnessed
Ms. Lundstrom running back toward the house, observed a male matching Mr. Evans’ build in
the driveway, and heard Mr. Lundstrom identify Mr. Evans as the person who shot her
(Tr., p.217, L.11 – p.225, L.10); Detective Jon Daubner, the detective assigned to the case
(Tr., p.226, L.11 – p.242, L.11, p.257, L.20 – p.321, L.19, p.424, Ls.1-13); Detective Jody
Newland, the detective who conducted the investigation involving Mr. Evans’ cellphone
(Tr., p.322, L.4 – p.329, L.20); Joshua Vermillion, Mr. Evans’ stepbrother, who testified that
Mr. Evans discussed the alleged crime with him and admitted to shooting Ms. Lundstrom
(Tr., p.332, Ls.14 – p.357, L.13); Kayla Colson, a former friend of Mr. Evans, who testified that
Mr. Evans had told her of plans to harm Ms. Lundstrom (Tr., p.361, L.20 – p.369, L.13, p.376,
Ls.18-21); Deputy Aaron Koopmans, an officer who responded to the scene of the shooting
(Tr., p.393, L.22 – p.398, L.8); and Detective Travis DeBie, the detective that took a cast of the
tire tracks at the scene and compared them to the vehicle Mr. Evans was driving on the night in
question (Tr., p.398, L.20 – p.423, L.12).
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During the trial, Mr. Evans made a motion for mistrial after Kayla Colson informed the
jury that she had warned Mr. Evans that, if he continued with a plan to harm his ex-wife, “he
would get caught and end up back in prison.” (Tr., p.366, Ls.2-15.) The motion for mistrial was
denied. (Tr., p.474, L.2 – p.481, L.11.)
The defense presented the testimony of Trishina Owens, Mr. Evans’ girlfriend, who
provided an alibi for Mr. Evans (Tr., p.440, L.4 – p.464, L.16), and Randy Evans, who
maintained his innocence (Tr., p.484, L.18 – p.537, L.13).
The jury found Mr. Evans guilty of both the battery with the intent to commit murder and
the weapon enhancement. (R., p.221.)
The case proceeded to sentencing. (R., p.257.) The State recommended a thirty-five year
sentence, with all thirty-five years fixed. (Tr., p.606, Ls.12-15.) Defense counsel requested that
the district court retain jurisdiction, with a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed.
(Tr., p.607, Ls.2-3.) The district court sentenced Mr. Evans to a unified sentence of thirty-five
years, with thirty years fixed. (R., pp.262-266.) Mr. Evans filed a Notice of Appeal timely from
the district court’s Judgment of Conviction Upon a Verdict of Guilty and Order of Commitment.
(R., pp.272-275.) He also filed a timely Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence, I.C.R.
35. (R., p.307.) The motion was denied. (Supplemental R., pp.14-21.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Evan’s motion for a mistrial?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Mr. Evans, a unified
sentence of thirty-five years, with thirty years fixed following his conviction for battery
with the intent to commit murder?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Evans’s Idaho Criminal Rule
35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Evan’s Motion For A Mistrial

A.

Introduction
The State presented the testimony Kayla Colson, a former friend of Mr. Evans. Despite

being warned by the district court to not mention prior convictions or incarceration, Ms. Colson
testified that she had warned Mr. Evans that, if he continued with a plan to harm his ex-wife, “he
would get caught and end up back in prison.” (Tr., p.366, Ls.2-15.) Defense counsel objected
and made a motion for a mistrial. The district court denied the motion for mistrial. Mr. Evans
asserts that the motion for mistrial was erroneously denied.

B.

Standard Of Review
Mr. Evans asserts that, following State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), the standard of

review for motions for mistrial is unclear. 1 Previously, Idaho courts have effectively review
denials of motions for mistrial de novo. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007).
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the
mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether
the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.
Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal
case, the “abuse of discretion” standard is a misnomer. The
standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our
focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed
retrospectively, constituted reversible error.
1

The Field standard has been referenced in post-Perry cases by Idaho appellate courts. See
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 68 (2011). However, it does not appear that the specific
question of whether Perry altered the burden of proof has been addressed.
5

Id. (quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912 (2003) (quoting State v. Shepherd, 124
Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1983))).
However, for alleged errors for which there was a timely objection, Mr. Evans only has
the duty to prove that an error occurred, “at which point the State has the burden of
demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
The Perry Court noted only two objections to this standard: when there is a structural defect or
when the jury reached its verdict based upon erroneous instruction. Id. at 227-228.
As such, there are two competing standards of review and it is unclear whether Mr. Evans
has the burden to prove that the failure to grant a motion for mistrial constituted reversible error
or if he only has to prove that an error occurred and the burden then shifts to the State to prove
that the erroneously admitted testimony did not contribute to the verdict. Regardless, error is
harmless and not reversible if the reviewing court is convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id. at 221.

C.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Evans’ Motion For Mistrial
Mr. Evans asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion for mistrial because

the erroneously admitted testimony deprived him of a fair trial. A motion for a mistrial is
controlled by I.C.R. 29.1, which provides that “[a] mistrial may be declared upon motion of the
defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or
conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the
defendant of a fair trial.” I.C.R. 29.1(a); State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1996).
Mr. Evans asserts that the district court erred in failing to grant a mistrial.
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1.

Relevant Factual Information

The district court ruled that information that Mr. Evans had been previously convicted of
a felony and served time in prison was inadmissible and asked that all witnesses be cautioned to
avoid these topics. (Tr., p.118, L.23 – p.119, L.8.)
Prior to Ms. Colson’s testimony, the district court cautioned her specifically to not
mention anything about Mr. Evans being in prison or being convicted of a felony:
THE COURT: Okay. And I’ve instructed the prosecution to talk to witnesses and
not mention any evidence or any facts indicating that Mr. Evans had been charged
with a felony. And I -- and your statement in particular does say that Randy was
in trouble with the law, he got out of prison.
It’s very important that we do not have a mistrial on this. Something like
that could be a mistrial. I think it’s very important not to bring that up at this
point. It’s just not appropriate.
Do you understand everything I’m saying?
MS. COLSON: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Do you -- will you agree to that?
MS. COLSON: Yes, absolutely.
THE COURT: And just listen to the prosecutor’s questions and answer the
question. Likewise for Mr. Taylor, just listen carefully and answer them. And
please don’t bring up anything about prison or a felony.
MS. COLSON: Yes, sir.
(Tr., p.360, Ls.3-22.)
Despite these warnings, Ms. Colson testified that Mr. Evans had been in prison. While
being asked about Mr. Evans’ alleged plan to harm Ms. Lundstrom and whether Ms. Colson has
attempted to dissuade Mr. Evans, Ms. Colson stated that she told Mr. Evans if he continued with
a plan to harm his ex-wife, “he would get caught and end up back in prison.” (Tr., p.366, Ls.215.) Counsel for Mr. Evans immediately objected. (Tr., p.366, L.16.) The district court

7

instructed the jury to “disregard any mention about prison” and “to disregard any evidence
whatsoever about prison.” (Tr., p.366, Ls.19-25.)
After the jury was excused, counsel made a motion for a mistrial noting:
Your Honor, I think the Court has done absolutely everything that it can,
has given all the advisories to counsel and to witnesses. We brought them in one at
a time to talk to them about what was in the affidavit and what was off limits.
We’ve talked about this in chambers.
It’s been – it’s kind of – it’s almost to the point of being harped on, and I
appreciate the Court’s efforts in that regard. I don’t think there’s anything more the
Court could have done to prevent it, and I don’t think it was malicious on the part
of the witness. I think it was a slip of the tongue; however, it was said. It was one
of the two things that this witness was specifically admonished on. And now that
it’s been said, nothing I do at this point is going to make any difference. The jury
has heard it, they know that that’s what happened to him in the past, and nothing
that I say at this point is going to make any difference.
This was something that was talked about explicitly. It is a violation of not
only the Court’s order, but the applicable rules pertaining thereto, and as much as I
don’t want to do this trial again, I don’t want to put this verdict in front of this jury
now.
(Tr., p.370, L.10 – p.371, L.7.) Counsel continued by arguing that stating the phrase “back in
prison” implies both that Mr. Evans had been convicted of a felony offense and that his
punishment was to serve a prison sentence for the felony conviction. (Tr., p.373, Ls.16-19.)
Counsel also asserted that the error had been highlighted by Ms. Colson stating she was “sorry”
and the court giving two limiting instructions sandwiching her apology. (Tr., p.373, L.20 –
p.374, L.1.)
After taking the matter under advisement, the district court ultimately denied the motion
for a mistrial. (Tr., p.481, Ls.6-7.) The district court noted that the “back to prison” statement
was “significant” and although the court “struggle[d]” with the decision, he did not believe the
statement deprived Mr. Evans of a fair trial. (Tr., p.480, L.21 – p.481, L.11.)
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2.

The Error In Denying The Motion For Mistrial Amount To Reversible Error

Evidence that Mr. Evans had been in prison was highly prejudicial. Prior to the State
calling any witnesses, the district court insured that all parties were aware information that
Mr. Evans had been in prison or convicted of a felony was not admissible, presumably because
such evidence was irrelevant and was highly prejudicial. (Tr., p.118, L.23 – p.119, L.8.) The
district court recognized the prejudicial nature of the evidence and specifically noted that having
the jury hear such evidence could result in a mistrial. This was evidenced by the district court’s
decision to not merely rely on the prosecution to counsel its witnesses away from mentioning
Mr. Evans’ criminal record and prior punishments, but to also provide instructions to several
witnesses directly, including Ms. Colson. (See Tr., p.118, L.23 – p.119, L.14, p.331, Ls.4-25,
p.360, Ls.3-23.)
Mr. Colson’s statement about Mr. Evans going “back to prison” was prejudicial and was
clearly error. Therefore, the State has the duty to prove that the erroneous admission of the
evidence was harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. Mr. Evans asserts that the State will be unable
to prove the error was harmless as it likely contributed to the verdict in his case.
Alternatively, if State v. Perry does not apply, Mr. Evans asserts that the errors amount to
reversible error because the prejudicial evidence likely had a continuing impact on the trial and
ultimately deprived Mr. Evans of his right to a fair trial.

Unquestionably, Ms. Colson’s

statement that Mr. Evans was previously in prison was highly prejudicial.
acknowledges that the jury was twice instructed to disregard the testimony.

Mr. Evans
However, he

maintains that a limiting instruction was insufficient to cure the error.
Admittedly, when Mr. Evans testified, the jury was made aware of his prior felony
conviction for grand theft. (Tr., p.512, Ls.8-14.) However, the word felony was never used.
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(Tr., p.512, Ls.8-14.)

And, more importantly, there was no discussion about Mr. Evans’

punishment for his grand theft conviction. (Tr., p.512, Ls.8-14.) Therefore, the only time the
jury heard this prejudicial information was from Ms. Colson. Mr. Evans argues that knowing he
had been previously punished for criminal conduct by being sent to prison is more prejudicial
than allowing the jury to merely know that he had been convicted of a pervious felony. Many
people who are convicted of felonies are put on probation. The fact that Mr. Evans was sent to
prison indicates that his prior crime was more serious than some felony offenses and that the
sentencing court believed he presented a greater danger to society.

This information is

undoubtedly highly prejudicial and is the type of information that taints a jury’s ability to
adequately and fairly evaluate evidence.
Allowing the jury to hear that Mr. Evans had been incarcerated, not just in county jail,
but prison, was prejudicial and deprived him of a fair trial. When viewed in the context of the
full record, the improper testimony likely had a continuing impact on the trial. There is a great
danger that, despite the limiting instruction, the jury considered Mr. Evans’ prior incarceration
and the stigma attached to his detriment.

As such, this erroneous testimony likely had a

continuing impact on the trial, may have contributed to the verdict, and, ultimately, deprived
Mr. Evans of his right to a fair trial. It was error for the district court to not declare a mistrial.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Evans, A Unified
Sentence Of Thirty-Five Years, With Thirty Years Fixed, Following His Conviction For Battery
With The Intent To Commit Murder
Mr. Evans asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of thirty-five
years, with thirty years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
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of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Evans does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Evans must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing
State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown,
121 Idaho 385 (1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility
of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe,
99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138
(2001)).
Appellate courts use a three-part test for determining whether a district court abused its
discretion: (1) whether the court correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2)
whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether it reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143 (2008) (citing Sun Valley
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991)).
Mr. Evans asserts that the district court failed to give proper weight and consideration to
the mitigating factors that exist in his case and, as a result, did not reach its decision by an
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exercise of reason.

Specifically, he asserts that the district court did not give proper

consideration to his family support and employment history.
In State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that
family and friend support were factors that should be considered in the Court’s decision as to
what is an appropriate sentence. Id. Mr. Evans has the support of his family. Both his father
and mother wrote letters of support for their son. (PSI, pp.36-38.)2 Mr. Evans’ mother noted
that he is a good person, has a good attitude, and is a hard worker, holding down two jobs. (PSI,
pp.37-38.) His father noted that, when his son is not using drugs, he is caring and dedicated to
his family. (PSI, p.36.)
Further, Mr. Evans has been able to maintain employment.

(PSI, pp.25-26.)

In

determining the appropriate sentence, a court should consider a defendant’s employment as a
mitigating factor. State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 119 (1955); State v. Baiz, 120 Idaho 292, 293
(Ct. App. 1991); State v. Hagedorn, 129 Idaho 155, 161 (Ct. App. 1996). At the time of his
arrest, Mr. Evans was working two jobs. (PSI, p.12.) He worked as a cook in two different
restaurants, Noodles and Company and Outback Steakhouse. (PSI, p.12.) He believes that he
will be able to return to these jobs upon release. (PSI, p.13.)
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Evans asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that had the district court
properly considered his family support and employment history, it would have imposed a less
severe sentence.

2

For ease of reference, the electronic file containing the Presentence Investigation Report and
attachments will be cited as “PSI” and referenced pages will correspond with the electronic page
numbers contained in this file.
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III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Evans’s Rule 35 Motion For A
Reduction Of Sentence
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if
the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App.
1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App.1987) and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447
(Ct. App. 1984)). “The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the
same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” Id. (citing
Lopez, 106 Idaho at 450). “If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant
must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional information presented with the
motion for reduction. Id. (citing State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114 (Ct. App. 1991)). “When
presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of
new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
Mr. Evans asserts that the district court failed to give proper weight and consideration to
the new information provided in support of the Rule 35 motion and the mitigating factors that
exist in his case and, as a result, did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason.
Mr. Evans supplied new and additional information to the district court. Attached to his
motion, was a Certificate of Appreciation awarded to Mr. Evans for “demonstrating a positive
and influential example of pro-social behaviors” while incarcerated. (R., p.310.) A defendant’s
conduct while in prison merits consideration in a Rule 35 motion. State v. Gonzales, 122 Idaho
17, 20 (Ct. App. 1992).
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Additionally, Mr. Evans testified at the Rule 35 hearing that he has the support of his
friends and family including, not only his parents, but also his step-father, grandparents, aunts
uncles, cousins, friends, and girlfriend. (Tr. 7/17/18, p.12, Ls.14-19.)3 He noted that he wants to
be “a good person” and “do all the good I can in any way I can and every place I can every time I
can to anyone I can.” (Tr. 7/17/18, p.10, Ls.5-7.)
Mr. Evans’ mother, Angel Smith, also testified at the hearing stating that she would
provide any support necessary for Mr. Evans upon his release. (Tr. 7/17/18, p.16, Ls.14-18.)
Ms. Smith noted that Mr. Evans also has support from other members of the commuting
including his sister, girlfriend, aunts, uncles, grandparents, step-father, friends, and former
bosses. (Tr. 7/17/18, p.17, L.6-15.) She also testified that she has noticed that Mr. Evans was
striving to be a better person since he has been incarcerated. (Tr. 7/17/18, p.17, Ls.15-17.)
Mr. Evans asserts that in light of the above additional information and the mitigating
factors mentioned in section II, which need not be repeated, but are incorporated by reference,
the district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion.

3

The transcript of the Rule 35 hearing will be cited as “Tr. 7/17/18.”
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Evans respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order denying his motion for a
mistrial and vacate the district court’s judgment of conviction. Alternatively, he requests that
this court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate or remand his case to the district court for
a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motion
be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 29th day of November, 2018.

/s/ Elizabeth Ann Allred
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of November, 2018, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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